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11.5 Foreclosure may be partial when the merged firm, for example, raises its price to a downstream competitor, thereby raising its rival’s costs. Foreclosure may be complete when the merged firm, for example, refuses to supply a downstream competitor. 11.3 The civil provisions of the Act may be available to address conduct by the merged firm that constitutes a refusal to deal, an abuse of dominance or other reviewable conduct. However, where the Bureau is able to remedy or enjoin a merger that is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, it will generally do so in preference to pursuing post‑merger remedies under other provisions of the Act.
For example, a merged firm may be able to increase prices to buyers that do not have the option to vertically integrate their operations, while other buyers with this option may be able to resist such a price increase. Where only a subset of buyers is able to counter a price increase or other exercise of market power, the Bureau will generally find that countervailing power is insufficient to prevent the merged firm from exercising market power in the relevant market. 7.7 When considering whether entry is likely to be on a scale and scope that would be sufficient to deter or counteract a material price increase, the Bureau examines what would be required from potential competitors who choose to enter. The Bureau will also consider any constraints or limitations on new entrants’ capacities or competitive effectiveness. Entry by firms that seek to differentiate themselves by establishing a niche to avoid direct competition with the merged firm may also not be sufficient to constrain an exercise of market power.
Footnote 21When the evidence suggests a change in the future price can be predicted with confidence, the Bureau may delineate markets based on the likely future price, even when that future price cannot be predicted precisely. Footnote 13Since the harm occasioned by a merger that substantially prevents competition may be sustained over the long term, the Bureau may consider longer time frames when assessing the effects of a prevention of competition than it does when assessing post‑merger entry . 12.22 The Bureau examines all relevant price and non‑price effects, including negative effects on allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency; redistributive effects; and effects on service, quality and product choice.
In addition, the calculation looks at volume’s contribution to price action, encouraging technicians to call it the ‘volume-weighted RSI’. MFI hits overbought above 80 and oversold below 20 and, like RSI, 14 is the most popular setting. ClassTargetDownsideDeviationThis indicator computes the n-period target downside deviation. The target downside deviation is defined as the root-mean-square, or RMS, of the deviations of the realized return’s underperformance from the target return where all returns above the target return are treated as underperformance of 0.
▶Importing Data
12.24 Some examples of potential anti‑competitive effects that can result from a merger are described below. While, in some cases, the negative impacts of a merger may be difficult to measure, all of the relevant anti‑competitive effects of a merger are considered for the purposes of the trade‑off. When anti‑competitive effects (such as redistributive effects and non‑price effects) cannot be quantified, they are considered from a qualitative perspective. 12.17 The Bureau also examines claims that the merger has or is likely to result in gains in dynamic efficiency, including those attained through the optimal introduction of new products, the development of more efficient productive processes, and the improvement of product quality and service.
For example, when a merger eliminates an innovative firm that presents a serious threat to incumbents, the merger may hinder or delay the introduction of new products, processes, marketing approaches, and aggressive research and development initiatives or business methods. 6.6 While the removal of a vigorous and effective competitor through a merger is likely to prevent or lessen competition to some degree, it may not, in itself, provide a sufficient basis for a decision to challenge the merger. Additionally, when a firm removed through a merger is not a vigorous or effective competitor (e.g., owing to financial distress, or declining technologies or markets), this fact is relevant to, but not determinative of, a decision not to challenge a merger. Footnote 52For example, a vertical merger may allow the merged firm to remove or “internalize” existing double marginalization, since there is no longer any need for a mark‑up on goods from the upstream firm to its downstream merger partner. With conglomerate mergers, the merged firm may be able to internalize the positive effect of a decrease in the price of one complementary product on the sales of another complementary product. This in turn may increase the output of both products, which is, all other things being equal, pro‑competitive.
The ability to close higher within those values lifts the Stochastic to a higher number between zero and 100. A security typically enters the overbought zone when above 80 and the oversold zone when below 20. ClassExponentialMovingAverageRepresents the traditional exponential moving average indicator . After the first sample, the value of the EMA indicator is a function of the previous EMA value.
This Part outlines the Bureau’s approach to minority interest transactions where the Bureau has jurisdiction under the merger provisions of the Act. 6.25 Coordinated behaviour may involve tacit understandings that are not explicitly negotiated or communicated among firms. Tacit understandings arise from mutual yet independent recognition that firms can, under certain market conditions, benefit from competing less aggressively with one another. Coordinated behaviour may also involve express agreements among firms to compete less vigorously or to refrain from competing.
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ClassKeltnerChannelsThis indicator creates a moving average with an upper band and lower band fixed at k average true range multiples away from the middle band. Bill Williams Alligator – The Alligator indicator comprises three lines each of which represents a moving average. The blue line represents the jaw, the red line represents the teeth, and the green line the lips. All of the moving average lines are editable and use the exponential moving average as the default. Connors RSI – A three period RSI, the Connors RSI is a composite indicator consisting of three components. Two use the Relative Strength Index calculations developed by Welles Wilder in the 1970’s, and the third ranks the most recent price change on a scale of 0 to 100.
Volume Exponential Moving Average – Identical to our existing Exponential Moving Average indicator except that it uses volume data instead of price data. Volume Weighted Moving Average – Identical to our existing Weighted Moving Average indicator except that it uses volume data instead of price data. Adaptive RSI and Stochastic – these are standard RSI and Stochastic oscillators though their period is changing while the period of the dominant cycle changes. DSP sees the price movement as a spinning wheel; this wheel rotates with different speed at different moments of time, and it is important to remember that this is ONE and the same wheel.
Footnote 18A market may consist of a single homogeneous product or a group of differentiated products. Footnote 3As outlined in the Bureau’s Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, paragraph 1.2, a transaction that does not fall within the definition of “merger” may in some instances be subject to review under the civil provision in section 90.1 of the Act. Parties who are uncertain as to whether an agreement will be assessed as a merger or a competitor collaboration are encouraged to consult the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines and to contact the Bureau at the earliest opportunity to discuss how the Bureau is likely to assess such an agreement if pursued. 13.5 These considerations are equally applicable to failure‑related claims concerning a division or a wholly‑owned subsidiary of a larger enterprise. However, in assessing submissions relating to the failure of a division or subsidiary, particular attention is paid to transfer pricing within the larger enterprise, intra‑corporate cost allocations, management fees, royalty fees, and other matters that may be relevant in this context. The value of such payments or charges is generally assessed in relation to the value of equivalent arm’s‑length transactions.
Unilateral effects of non‑horizontal mergers
The extent to which merging parties and other sellers take distant sellers into account in their business plans, marketing strategies and other documentation can also be a useful indicator for geographic market definition. 4.17 For the purpose of geographic market definition, what matters is not the identity of the sellers, but buyers’ ability or willingness to switch their purchases in sufficient quantity from suppliers in one location to suppliers in another, in response to changes in relative prices. A relevant geographic market consists of all supply points that would have to be included for a SSNIP to be profitable, assuming that there is no price discrimination (as described in paragraph 4.8 above). When price discrimination is present , geographic markets are defined according to the location of each targeted group of buyers. 2.4 The Bureau also applies this analytical framework to its assessment of the market power of the buyers of a product.
- For example, falling volume while price is rising above the overbought level can turn the MFI lower, generating a bearish divergence that warns about an imminent reversal.
- The issue is whether the efficiency gains will benefit the Canadian economy rather than the nationality of ownership of the company.
- Other costs include the expense buyers must incur when a product fails to satisfy expectations, which may damage a buyer’s reputation as a reseller, or require the shutdown of a production line.
- Demand elasticities indicate how buyers change their consumption of a product in response to changes in the product’s price (own‑price elasticity) or in response to changes in the price of another identified product (cross‑price elasticity).
6.15 The closeness of competition between the merging firms’ products may be measured by the diversion ratio between them.Footnote 35 The value of the diverted sales from one merging firm depends on the volume of diverted sales and the profit margin on the diverted sales. The greater the value of the diverted sales, the greater the incentive the merged firm has to raise prices. 5.6 The Bureau generally includes the total output or total capacity of current sellers located within the relevant market in the calculation of the total size of the market and the shares of individual competitors. However, when a significant proportion of output or capacity is committed to business outside the relevant market and is not likely to be available to the relevant market in response to a SSNIP, the Bureau generally does not include this output or capacity in its calculations. 4.25 Buyers’ willingness or ability to turn to foreign sellers may be affected by buyers’ tastes and preferences, and by border‑related considerations. Buyers may be less willing or able to switch to foreign substitutes when faced with factors such as exchange rate risk, local licensing and product approval regulations, industry‑imposed standards, or initiatives to “buy local” owing to difficulties or uncertainties when crossing the border.
The Indicator Series: Following the trend, the Aroon Oscillator
AD Volume Ratio is used in technical analysis to see where the main trading activity is focused. MA Crossover – A crossover occurs when a faster Moving Average (i.e. a shorter period moving average) crosses either above or below a slower (i.e. longer period) moving average. A crossover that moves above a slower MA is considered a bullish crossover; one that moves below is considered a bearish crossover. Analyst – In a world where upgrades and downgrades move markets, staying blackbull markets review on top of analyst activity is a necessity. Our new sell-side Analyst Rating tear sheet provides summary rating and price target statistics along with upgrade/downgrade history, and graphs mean ratings history, price target history and rating distribution over time. Footnote 64The market realities of the industry in question will be considered in determining whether particular efficiencies could reasonably be expected to be achieved through non‑merger alternatives.
Elder Force Index – quantifies the relative power needed to move price by comparing current price to prior price and multiplying by trading volume during the period. Disparity Index – evaluates the current price of a security in relation to a moving average. Coppock Curve – calculates a 10-month weighted moving average of the sum of the 14-month and 11-month rates of change of an index to determine long-term momentum. Chande Forecast Oscillator – measures the percentage difference between a closing price and a linear regression line over a specified time period.
7.10 Substantial sunk costs directly affect the likelihood of entry and constitute a significant barrier to entry. In general, since entry decisions are typically made in an environment in which success is uncertain, the likelihood of significant future entry decreases as the absolute amount of sunk entry costs relative to the estimated rewards of entry increases. The Bureau’s assessment of sunk costs also focuses on the time required to become an effective competitor and the probability of success, and whether these factors justify making the required investments. 7.2 Entry is only effective in constraining the exercise of market power when it is viable. When entry is likely, timely and sufficient in scale and scope, an attempt to increase prices is not likely to be sustainable as buyers of the product in question are able to turn to the new entrant as an alternative source of supply. 6.38 Effective coordination may be constrained before the merger by the activities of a particularly vigorous and effective competitor (a “maverick”).
Assuming that rivals do not sell the same range of products as the merged firm, such tying may foreclose rivals by reducing their ability to compete, thereby preventing or lessening competition substantially. 11.2 Non‑horizontal mergers are generally less likely to prevent or lessen competition substantially than are horizontal mergers. This is because non‑horizontal mergers may not entail the loss of competition between the merging firms in a relevant market. Non‑horizontal mergers also frequently create significant efficiencies.Footnote 52 However, non‑horizontal mergers may reduce competition in some circumstances, as outlined below. The two main types of non‑horizontal mergers are vertical mergers and conglomerate mergers. A vertical merger is a merger between firms that produce products at different levels of a supply chain (e.g., a merger between a supplier and a customer).
Center Of Gravity – is a forward-looking indicator that generates crossovers to identify high odds turning points in rangebound markets. Money Flow Index looks at price and volume to identify overbought and oversold conditions. As with RSI, MFI generates convergence-divergence signals when comparing the trajectories of price and indicator, with divergences often producing the most profitable buy or sell signals.
Interlocking directorates may be features of minority interest transactions; for example, a firm that acquires a minority interest in its competitor may also obtain rights to nominate one or more directors to its competitor’s board. An interlocking directorate would rarely qualify, in and questrade review of itself, as the establishment of a significant interest. 1.15 An interlocking directorate may arise where a director of one firm is an employee, executive, partner, owner or member of the board of directors of a second firm, or has another interest in the business of the second firm.
A transaction is notifiable where the relevant transaction‑size and party‑size thresholds are exceeded and, in the case of a share acquisitionFootnote 5, where the shareholding threshold (voting interest of more than 35% for a private corporation or more than bitcoin brokers canada 20% for a public corporation) is also exceeded. The algebraic combinations of these spectral bands needs to be sensitive to one or more of these factors. These products provide crop protection at every stage, helping promote vigorous growth and high yields.